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1  Introduction 
 
Although the current reform debate on the future of the EU budget is characterised by a 
variety of views there is a wide consensus that the current expenditure structure of the budget 
is not optimal. In particular, the overweight of transfer policies and the neglect of policies of a 
European public good type are regularly criticised (a well-known example is the Sapir report; 
Sapir et al., 2004).  
In our contribution we offer a theoretical explanation for these deficiencies. For this purpose 
we adapt the seminal political-economic model by Besley and Coate (2003) who point to the 
possible coordination failures in centralised decision making. We extend this model by 
integrating important features of the European Union such as income heterogeneity, a GNI 
dependent revenue formula and the existence of transfer policies in the EU budget besides 
local and European public goods. In this model, the common pool problem is at the heart of 
inefficiencies in centralised decision making, as locally elected representatives decide on the 
allocation of spending at the central level which is financed out of a common pool, so that it is 
largely borne by other jurisdictions. As a consequence, local representatives face incentives to 
use their influence in central decision processes for promoting those transfers with an 
advantageous distributive effect from their country's position. 
In the light of this model we analyse not only how certain characteristics of the status quo 
such as a cap on revenues impact on the incentives of local representatives. We also scrutinise 
the effects of several reform options which are being debated. In brief, it is shown that the 
introduction of a tax directly payable to the European level might even increase the relative 
attractiveness of transfers over public goods. By introducing a generalised correction 
mechanism a more efficient allocation of expenditures can be reached, shifting resources to 
the provision of EU-wide public goods. However, at the same time, this mechanism has a 
distorting effect for the ratio of local and European public good. Finally, the concept of a 
generalised but limited correction mechanism as proposed by Heinemann et al. (2008) is 
demonstrated to have advantageous properties if an appropriate differentiation of policies 
included in the correction formula can be achieved.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the literature on 
explanations given for the current neglect of European public goods in the budget. In section 
3, we describe the theoretical literature which is our model's starting point. In section 4, the 
model is specified. In section 5, results referring to the status quo of the EU budget are 
depicted. In section 6, reform options for the own resources system are introduced and their   3
impact on expenditure policies is discussed on the basis of the model. Finally, section 7 
concludes.   
 
2  Explaining the allocation of EU expenditures 
 
The allocation of EU budget expenditures with its focus on transfers has frequently been 
criticised. According to the theory of fiscal federalism, the budget of a supranational union 
such as the EU should be focussed on the provision of well-specified public goods. The 
literature on public good provision in international unions, building on the basic principles of 
fiscal federalism (see Oates, 1999), prescribes mainly two criteria which justify the 
assignment of tasks and resources to the central level: (a) economies of scale and (b) 
externalities. However, a harmonisation of policies might also have a negative effect, as the 
heterogeneity of preferences within a union increases with the number of citizens (Alesina, 
Angeloni & Etro, 2005; 2001a; 2001b). In their scrutiny of EU activities in different policy 
areas, Alesina, Angeloni and Schuhknecht (2005) find a mixed picture regarding the 
accordance of normative criteria and actual involvement of the EU: The involvement of the 
EU in certain policy areas, such as international trade or the common market, seems to be 
perfectly justified. Furthermore, the low involvement in other areas, such as education, 
research and culture, is backed by theory due to high preference asymmetries. However, 
several inconsistencies can be found such as the heavy EU involvement in agricultural policy 
and the existence of those regional funds which mainly favour better-off regions.
4 By contrast, 
several areas exist where theory would claim a higher involvement than can actually be 
observed, such as in certain aspects of international relations or migration issues.  
This misbalanced involvement of the EU in the various policy areas is also reflected in the 
budgetary allocations.
5 The structure of the actual expenditure agreed for the period 2007-
2013 can be seen in Figure 1. Apparently, two policy areas have dominated the overall 
expenditure over the past decades and still prevail: agricultural and structural policies. As it 
has frequently been criticised, these expenditures are difficult to justify on theoretical grounds 
and their efficiency is frequently doubted. Instead, they are dominated by redistributive 
motives (see Tabellini, 2003). These transfers arise as intercountry transfers (cohesion funds), 
interindustrial transfers (mainly to agricultural enterprises), or interregional transfers 
                                                 
4 This is the case for the “Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective”, one of the current objectives 
of structural spending. 
5 Note, however, that the budgetary structure is only a rough indicator of EU involvement since regulatory 
policies do not show up in budgetary numbers.   4
(targeting poorer regions). Although the resulting redistributive net transfers are to a great 
extent driven by differences in national wealth and thus by the motives of structural policies, 
de la Fuente and Domenéch (2001) show that even between countries with similar income 
levels differences in national net positions can be observed.  
 
Figure 1: Allocation of expenditures of the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 (in bn. €) 
4 - EU as global partner 
€ 49.5
(5.7%)
5 - Administration 
€ 49.80
(5.8%)
6 - Compensation 
€ 0.8 
(0.1%)
1a - Competitiveness 
€ 74.1
(8.6%)
1b - Cohesion 
€ 308.0
(35.6%)
2 - Conservation and 
management of natural 
resources, 
€ 78.2
(9.1%)
2 - Agriculture - market support 
measures and direct payments
€ 293.1
(33.9%)
3 - Citizenship, freedom, 
security and justice
€ 10.8
(1.3%)
 
 
Source: European Parliament, European Council and European Commission (2006). 
 
Given this budget structure, several authors like Tabellini (2003) or the Sapir commission 
(Sapir et al., 2004) have demanded a higher involvement of the EU in those policies which 
can be expected to create a European added value. This would imply a shifting of resources 
from the mentioned distributive spending to public goods in areas like international affairs, 
immigration or security policy (external aid, border controls), as well as R&D and innovation 
policies, hence areas, where economies of scale or positive external effects prevail.   
As to the explanation of this inconsistency between normative criteria and the status quo 
mainly three different approaches can be found in the literature. A first approach regards the 
status quo as the outcome of a highly path dependent historical development (see Hix, 2005; 
Carruba, 1997; Blankart & Kirchner, 2004). According to this view, the cornerstones of the 
present system are the results of political bargaining in the past. Changes mainly occurred due 
to the fact that less integrationist countries demanded a compensation for new integration 
steps: for instance, the CAP served as a compensation for France in return for the opening of 
its market, and the cohesion fund as a compensation for the poorer countries in return for the 
introduction of the monetary union. Blankart and Koester (this volume) emphasise that   5
countries were successful in this regard whenever there was a credible threat to leave the EU 
at that time. All in all, the overall redistribution through the budget is interpreted as a 
compensation for those countries with lower or even no benefits from European integration 
(Hix, 2005). But even when the reasons underlying the compensations ceased to exist 
subsequently, it was hard or even impossible to remove them. Due to the unanimity 
requirement in the Council any changes could easily be blocked by the beneficiaries of such 
policies, which resulted in a “re-distributive deadlock” (Blankart & Koester, this volume). 
A second strand of literature focuses on voting-power explanations. The empirical literature 
(Rodden, 2002; Kauppi & Widgrén, 2004; Mattila, 2006) shows that expenditure patterns 
favour the smaller member states which are overrepresented in the EU Council as well as in 
the Parliament. Smaller countries can use their influence to attract relatively higher returns 
from the main expenditure categories, such as CAP, structural funds and internal policies. 
However, this literature is only partly capable of explaining the distribution of funds within 
the policy areas beyond objective criteria, such as national prosperity or share in agricultural 
production, but it does not provide an insight regarding the overall expenditure structure of 
the budget. 
A third relevant strand of literature is theoretical and devoted to the study of decision making 
in multi-layer systems of governments. It deals with the centralisation of activities in 
international unions and will be briefly surveyed in the next section. It becomes clear that this 
literature has so far not considered an overspending in some policy areas and underspending 
in others with respect to the unique institutional characteristics of the EU budget.  
 
 
3  Related Theoretical Literature 
 
While the early theoretical literature on fiscal federalism based on the seminal work by Oates 
(1972) mainly concentrates on the supply of public goods in federal countries, later 
contributions also deal with international unions whose purpose is the supply of a limited 
scope of public goods (Alesina et al., 2005; 2001a; 2001b). This literature mainly deals with 
the endogenous formation of international unions, focussing on their size, composition and 
scope. In these models, countries in international unions face a trade-off between the gains 
from policy coordination (due to spillovers or economies of scales) and its costs related to the 
loss of individual policy making. Then, the optimal formation of an international union might 
fail due to an inefficient provision of local public goods by the central level of the union. This 
inefficient allocation might be caused by several factors. Diverging preferences for public   6
goods between the countries can keep countries with lower preferences away from the 
international union in case the countries with higher preferences have the majority of votes, or 
it can lead to a larger, but less centralised union. If redistribution takes place within a union, 
because the member states differ in their prosperity, an inefficient composition of the union 
becomes possible since poor countries may not be allowed to enter (Alesina et al., 2001b). A 
decisive feature of these models is the voluntariness of participation in an international union. 
Therefore, these approaches take the size of a union as endogenous and mainly concentrate on 
the determination of the scope and composition of these unions. 
A different explanation for inefficient centralisation was proposed by Besley and Coate 
(2003).
6 In their model, the size of a union is taken as exogenous and the assumption of a 
uniform allocation of public goods is softened. Consequently, inefficient levels of public 
expenditures are not caused by different preferences for public goods between the 
jurisdictions, but by the potentiality of a non-uniform geographical allocation of the local 
public goods. Depending on the applied decision-making rule at the central level, the result 
may either be an inefficient geographical allocation of these goods which is biased towards 
the jurisdictions whose representatives dominate decision making on the central level, or a 
general overprovision of public goods. Obviously, the former result is closely related to the 
well-known “common pool problem” of public good provision which is based on the 
literature of common choice (e.g., Shepsle & Weingast, 1981). In this public choice approach, 
the emphasis is placed on the tendency of central governments to overspend, because local 
representatives do not sufficiently internalise the costs borne by other jurisdictions when they 
demand for local public goods for their own jurisdiction. 
In a similar approach, Lorz and Willmann (2005) focus on the endogenous formation of the 
degree of centralisation. By incorporating a continuum of public goods which differ in their 
degree of spill-overs and by endogenising the cost sharing, they show that the degree of 
public good provision is suboptimal low under strategic delegation, which contradicts the 
result of Besley and Coate (2003).  
However, these approaches only explain one characteristic of EU spending at a time – 
overspending or underspending in some policy areas. Only a recent contribution by Dur and 
Roelfsema (2005), in a Besley-Coate-type model, finds an explanation for the coexistence of 
under- and overspending. This result is driven by the existence of non-shareable costs of local 
public good provision, i.e. costs which are not paid by the central level but by the local 
jurisdictions (e.g. environmental policy imposing costs on local industries or multilateral 
                                                 
6 For an extensive overview of related political-economic approaches, see Lockwood (2006).   7
peacekeeping with local casualties). If the share of these non-shareable costs is high (low), the 
delegated decision on the central level leads to undersupply (oversupply). The reason is that 
with high local costs local policy makers delegate bargaining to “conservatives” with a bias 
against spending on public goods. This stands in contrast to the original Besley-Coate result 
where the common pool aspect sets incentives to delegate public good lovers and thus leads to 
overspending. 
However, although this contribution offers helpful insights to understand different degrees of 
centralisation of EU policies it still abstracts from institutional features of the European 
Union. Hence, in the following model, the focus will be on the integration of important 
characteristics of this specific European community of states.  
 
 
4  The Model 
 
Similar to the approach of Dur and Roelfsema (2005), several basic features of our model are 
borrowed from the workhorse model of Besley and Coate (2003). A two-region model is 
assumed, indexed by i{1,2}. Both regions are identical in population which has a mass of 
unity.  
The utility of individual j in country i can be expressed by the following function:   
 
(1) 
jjj
iii i i U x [ln(g ) ln(g ) ln(G)]       ; 
 
j
i x  is consumption of private goods, 
j
i   is the preference for public goods,  i g  is consumption 
of a local public good provided in country i,  i g  is consumption of a local public good 
provided in the other country, whereas   denotes the spill-over which is assumed to be 
(0,1)   and equal for both countries. G denotes the provision of a Union-wide public good 
which is provided uniformly to all citizens of the Union; a feature which will be explained 
below in greater detail.  
The utility for the public goods is strictly increasing and strictly concave and assumed to be 
equal for all individuals and both regions. In this regard, the model differs from the 
approaches quoted above, as individuals in both countries do not differ in their preferences for 
public goods. Instead, they differ in their income. The individual income 
j
i y  is equally 
distributed in both countries over an interval 
min max
ii y; y      , the median income in both   8
countries is denoted as 
m
i y . The national income  i Y  of country i results as the sum of all 
individual incomes in that country, so that
j
ii
j
Yy  . In the following, it will be assumed that 
country 1 has a higher national income, so that, due to the assumption on the distribution of 
the incomes, the median income is higher as well, thus,
mm
12 yy  .   
At least in one aspect this model is closer to resembling the traditional approaches of, for 
instance, Alesina et al. (2001a), than the political-economic models of Besley and Coate 
(2003) or Dur and Roelfsema (2005): We assume that a central decision on the provision of 
the local public good implies uniformity in the level of local public goods, so that  ii gg   . At 
first glance, this seems to be a strong assumption. In principle, it would be possible for the EU 
to enforce a provision of local public goods with differentiated quantities. However, reality 
resembles more a uniform provision of this spending category.  
One prime example of this category is the “Territorial Cooperation Objective”, one of the 
components of structural policies. This fund has a clear local allocation of spending, but is 
devoted to transnational and cross-border cooperation. Hence, it creates spill-over effects, so 
that it is a good example of a local public good. The allocation of the fixed EU wide amount 
for this objective follows a single criterion which is the number of citizens living in border 
areas. Therefore, it is not possible to unilaterally increase the spending in one country or 
jurisdiction alone. Procedures limiting the freedom of the central level to decide on local 
public good provisions exist in many other EU policy areas as well. A further example is the 
application of the excellence principle in the Framework Programmes for Research and 
Technological Development.               
In addition to the existence of a local public good which corresponds to former models, a 
supra-regional public good (in our context a “European public good”) is introduced, denoted 
as G, whose utility is again increasing and concave. This extension is of crucial importance 
since as mentioned above the neglect for European public goods is a central weakness of the 
EU budget's status quo so that a meaningful theoretical exposition must include this type of 
public good. Two properties differentiate local from European public goods. First, European 
public goods are non-excludable and non-rival from the perspective of member countries 
whereas local public goods are merely characterised by possible cross-border spillovers but 
not by full European non-excludability. Second, the relevant fiscal flows for local public 
goods can be attributed to member states, whereas expenditures for European public goods 
cannot. This differentiation is relevant for the analysis of reform options due to the different 
treatment of “allocated” and “non-allocated” spending in the EU accounting. “Allocated”   9
funds are taken account of in the calculation of country net fiscal flows from the budget 
whereas “non-allocated” funds are not. In the model, it is assumed that expenditures for 
European public goods are – in contrast to the local public goods and the redistributive 
expenditure – entirely booked as “non-allocated” by the EU. This corresponds to the actual 
treatment of policy areas such as external policies in the usual net balance statistics.
7 
The budget constraint of the individual can be expressed as following: 
 
(2) 
jj 1 1 2 2
ii i i x( 1) y S S       
 
The private consumption of an individual is financed from two sources: first, from individual 
income 
j
i y  minus a proportional income tax, denoted as a rate , which is paid to the central 
level. This setting is similar to Etro and Giarda (2007). The rate  is initially assumed to be 
equal for all individuals and regions, and can therefore be regarded as a “GNI tax” on the 
aggregate level. This modelling corresponds to the GNI link of own resources payments in the 
current revenue system. 
Second, transfers from the central level serve as a further revenue source. As an important 
modification to existing models, a share 
k
i   of payments from two redistributive policies 
k S,  
k=1,2, allows the individual to finance private goods. This model feature represents targeted 
transfer payments from the central level which favour both countries to a different degree. 
This adjustment is motivated to depict the characteristics of EU expenditure policy with its 
dominant role of agricultural and structural spending. Both policies have negligible cross-
border spill-overs or economies of scale, but mainly serve to transfer money to specific 
regions or groups of people. At the same time both spending items have highly different 
distributive profiles which largely depend on the size of a country's agricultural sector (for the 
Common Agricultural Policy) or the relative wealth of countries (for structural policies). In 
this regard, these redistributive goods are different from the local public goods which are 
characterised by interjurisdictional spill-overs. 
Corresponding to these real life characteristics these payments are modelled as follows: it is 
assumed that for both policy areas the distributive pattern is given exogenously, while only 
the overall amount of payments in the policy areas is negotiable. This seems to be reasonable 
given the institutional setting in the EU, as the national allocation of the spending within the 
                                                 
7 We do not assume that these net balance statistics are good indicators of national welfare. However, the 
distinction between goods that can or cannot be allocated becomes important in the analysis how different 
correction mechanisms change the incentives of decision makers (see sections 6.2 and 6.3 below).   10
policy areas is largely rule-based. It is assumed that these two categories benefit the two 
countries in opposing directions, i.e. the category 1 rather benefits country 1:
11
21 01    , 
and category 2 is advantageous for country 2: 
22
12 01   . For instance, the national shares 
of the expenditure might be determined by the share in agricultural production, the share in 
regions with lower than average wealth, or the share in regions with low population density.
8  
Although these expenditures are usually earmarked in the EU, their treatment in the model as 
being purely redistributive payments which benefit all citizens of a country to the same degree 
is expedient. As these payments replace national public expenditure, which would be 
necessary to offset the beneficiaries if the policies were renationalised, the financing by the 
central level gives the national budgets leeway. This enables tax cuts, which are distributed to 
all citizens and increase their income which is disposable for consumption. However, as this 
implicit redistribution process is full of distortions (administrative costs, fraud, rent-seeking 
behaviour), it cannot be assumed that it is a zero sum game. Therefore, a cost term c is 
introduced in the budget constraint of the central level.
9 Moreover, the central level can 
provide the local public good at price p and the European public good at price q. The overall 
expenditures have to equal the revenues from the GNI tax, so the budget constraint of the 
central level yields:     
     (3) 
12 1 2 j
ii i
ji
p ( g g)q GS S c ( S )c ( S ) ( y )          ; 
c is strictly increasing and convex: c0   ,  c0   . In the following, we assume for simplicity 
that 
kk 2 1
c(S ) (S )
2
 . 
The expenditure of the Union (the two local public goods, the interregional public good and 
the redistributive payments) are financed by the sum of the national contributions which are 
primarily denoted as a GNI tax as introduced above. This breakdown of the financing of the 
Union best reflects the current situation in the EU, where the bulk is financed via GNI 
proportional contributions. It should be pointed out that with this allocation, the financing is 
not divided 50:50 as assumed in the models described in section 3, unless the incomes of the 
median voters are identical which has been excluded above. The share of total contributions 
of one country, denoted as i  , is calculated as its share in total national income, so that 
                                                 
8 In the following, the mere existence of the opportunity to redistribute payments to small interest groups or 
regions is taken as exogenous. However, its existence may be explained by lobbying for the provision of these 
goods. Recent literature indicates that lobbying for regional public goods provision is less costly under 
centralisation; see Bordignon, Colombo and Galmarini (2005).   
9 This simple handling of costs due to redistribution is similar to Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, p. 85ff).    11
i
i
ii
Y
YY 


. This ratio is, due to the assumptions on the distribution of the incomes, equal 
to the ratio of the median incomes. As it is assumed that country 1 is richer than country 2, the 
cost-sharing in the status quo denotes that 
12 1 2 2 2
12
11
2pg qG S S (S ) (S )
22 YY
2
   
    
for the two economies.   
 
5  General Analysis  
 
5.1  Social optimum 
 
In a first step, the optimal level of public good provision is presented which can be obtained 
by a central planner. This approach is referred to as the “standard approach” by Besley and 
Coate (2003: p. 2615). It assumes the existence of a benevolent planner at the central level 
who maximises the welfare of the individuals in both regions. As it has been assumed that the 
median voter’s preferences for public goods are identical in both regions, the following 
function reflects the aggregate welfare: 
(4) 
Sm 1 2
ii
11 2 22 2
ii
V ((1 )ln(g ) (1 )ln(g ) 2ln(G)) S S
11
p(g g ) qG (S (S ) ) (S (S ) )
22


      
    
     
The first order conditions give the following optimal allocation of the amount of goods 
allocated on the central level,  i g ,  i g ,G, 
1 S  and 
2 S : 
m
ii
(1 )
gg
p


 , 
m 2
G
q

 , 
1 S0  , 
2 S0   
This reflects the well-known results that the optimal quantity of public goods rises with 
increasing spill-overs and preferences for public spending, and decreases in the costs of these 
goods, p and q. Moreover, the optimal amount of redistributive payments is zero in the model, 
which is straightforward as due to its additional costs any positive provision of these 
payments has a negative impact on the aggregate welfare.
10   
 
5.2  Decentralised decision making 
 
                                                 
10 Of course, this does not imply that redistribution within the European Union is per se inefficient. However, it 
is this procedure of implicit redistribution which is highly inefficient; for an approach towards an optimal 
redistribution between regions, see Bordignon, Melasse and Tabellini (2001). For further reflections on this issue 
see section 6.4.   12
In this second step, the outcome of a decentralised provision of public goods is compared to 
the social optimum presented above. Applied to the European Union, this approach reflects 
the assignment of the provision of all of the public goods introduced above to the national 
level, so that each national government decides individually on its levels of provision.  
The result is straightforward and in line with previous findings (see Dur and Roelfsema, 
2005). As the spill-overs to the other countries are not entirely internalised in the national 
level, an underprovision of public goods is the consequence. The result is
m
i g
p

 . 
The results regarding the provision of the European public good, however, are ambiguous. 
Both countries decide independently over an amount  i G  which they want to contribute to the 
interregional public good G. Usually, it is assumed that a country behaves strategically and 
incorporates the other country’s provision in its decision, and vice versa. This model is similar 
to the problem of voluntary provision of public goods (see e.g. Mueller, 2003: p. 18). The 
result is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which implies the provision of a quantity of less than 
the Pareto-optimal quantity, and thus again an underprovision of the public good. 
As in the social optimum, the provision of the two distributive goods 
1 S  and 
2 S is likewise 
zero. Although intranational redistribution would not be excluded in the model, it does not 
take place due to the assumption of the uniform distribution of incomes. As a consequence 
from this assumption, the median income is equal to the mean income so that the median 
voter’s utility would decrease with increased spending for these goods. In case of a skewed 
distribution, redistribution via the distributive good would become worthwhile for the median 
voter (whose income would then be lower than the mean income), and a positive amount of 
both redistributive goods 
1 S  and 
2 S  would be provided in the decentralised solution. 
 
 
5.3  Centralised decision making with non-cooperative behaviour  
 
In the following, the outcome of centralisation at the highest level will be modelled according 
to a simple political approach as proposed by Besley and Coate (2003). In the approach 
applied here, denoted as “non-cooperative” approach, it is assumed that decisions at the 
central level are made by a minimum winning coalition (MWC), which implies that the 
allocation of expenditures is executed by a coalition which gets at least 50% plus 1 vote of the 
representatives. As both jurisdictions are equal in size and voting power, the probability that 
each jurisdiction’s representative will be in power is 50%. If he is in power, the representative 
will be able to fully benefit the median-voter of his jurisdiction with the spending from the   13
central level, while the costs of these policies will be shared between the jurisdictions. Hence, 
this cost-sharing rule is responsible for the common-pool problem in this setting, which has an 
effect as long as the regional public goods do not exhibit full spill-over effects to the other 
jurisdiction. Then, as a result of this non-cooperative model, two main drawbacks emerge: (a) 
a misallocation, because the spending mainly takes place in the jurisdiction of the 
representative who is in power, and (b) uncertainty, because the allocation of expenditures 
will not be known until the formation of the minimum winning coalition.
11 
This “non-cooperative” political economy approach, as introduced above, is now applied to 
the model sketched in the sections before. As citizens in the two jurisdictions differ only with 
respect to their income, citizens in both regions delegate the negotiation on the central level to 
a representative with median income. In the underlying solution concept, the representatives 
of both jurisdictions maximise their utility in the case of being in power, so that the median 
voter can expect the highest utility if his representative has control over the central policy.  
The maximisation problem of the representative from country i can thus be stated as 
following: 
(5) 
mm 1 1 2 2
ii i i i i i i
11 2 22 2
V [ln(g ) ln(g ) ln(G)] S S (p(g g ) qG
11
(S (S ) ) (S (S ) ))
22
        
  
 
First-order conditions give: 
m
opt
i
i
(1 )
g
2p
 


and 
m
opt
i
i
G
q



. 
It can be seen that the provision of the local public good corresponds only to the optimal 
amount if both countries contribute equal shares to the budget, i.e. i
1
2
  , which reflects the 
case of both countries having the same income, so that both median incomes are the same. If 
this is not the case, as assumed before, the poorer country’s representative chooses a too high 
amount of the good, the amount chosen by the richer country’s representative is too low. This 
result holds for the European public good as well. 
The first-order conditions for the redistributive goods are as follows: 
11
ii (1 c (S )) 0       
22
ii (1 c (S )) 0       
                                                 
11 Note that Besley and Coate (2003) introduce a further solution concept with a “cooperative” legislature. It 
shows that in case the decision being made by the representatives at the central level in order to maximise the 
joint surplus, a strategic delegation to a representative with higher preferences for public goods than the median 
takes place, thereby, leading to an inefficient oversupply.   14
Obviously, for agent 1 only the first equation can have an interior solution. As for the 
representative from country i in general 
k
ii   for ki  , any positive amount of 
k S  would 
lead to net returns from the central budget which are smaller than zero, as the share of 
contributions he has to pay is in any case higher than the returns from the central level. For 
k S  
withki  , however, the outcome is a positive quantity. Then, the optimal amount 
is
k
k ii
i
S
 


.  
At this point, the common pool problem enters the model: due to the existence of a good with 
a predetermined payment profile that exclusively favours one country, a higher than optimal 
amount of this good is provided because the benefited country has to contribute at a lower 
level to its provision than it benefits from it.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that a certain degree of fiscal redistribution from the richer to 
the poorer regions exists even if the richer region’s representative, agent 1, constitutes the 
minimum winning coalition and chooses the policy. As agent 1 always demands a positive 
amount of the regional public good g which is uniformly allocated to both regions, but pays a 
share larger than one half, he is (in an accounting sense) always a net contributor as long as 
this is not overcompensated by a high allocation of 
1 S , which will be excluded for simplicity 
in the following.  
Obviously, these results crucially depend on the assumption of a uniform distribution of 
incomes. If this were given up, the outcomes may change significantly. If a region had a left 
skewed distribution, the median voter would choose an even higher quantity of the 
redistributive good which benefits his country, and it might even become profitable for him to 
choose a positive amount of the other redistributive good. Both outcomes depend on the 
distance of the median voter’s income from the mean income. Moreover, the outcome 
regarding the provision of the public goods changes if both countries differ in the skewness of 
their income distribution. In case the richer country’s income distribution is much more left 
skewed than the poorer ones so that the richer country’s median voter is poorer than the poor 
country’s median voter, then the richer country’s representative will even choose a higher 
level of public good provision than the poorer country’s one.      
Note that in this setting, due to the assumptions made in section 4, inefficiencies do not arise 
because of an unequal provision of public goods as in the model by Besley and Coate (2003), 
or different preferences between the jurisdictions as, for instance, in Alesina et al. (2005). 
Instead, inefficiencies are caused by the way implicit redistribution takes place which enters 
the model through two channels: (1) The unequal participation in the financing (per head)   15
leads to non-optimal provision of public goods, even under the assumption of identical 
preferences and allocation of the public goods. (2) The existence of goods with predetermined 
distribution patterns allows the representatives to pursue non-efficient redistribution to a 
certain extent.  
These specific arrangements of the model are in line with some observations for the EU 
budget discussed above. Redistributive transfer payments are higher than the social optimum, 
as it is shown in the model that the provision of these redistributive goods is larger than zero, 
while it should be zero in the social optimum. This is the equivalent of the misallocation 
outcome as found by Besley and Coate (2003). However, in this first step, it is not possible to 
explain the suboptimal low level of the public goods, which can even turn out to be too high 
in this approach. 
 
5.4  Budget cap 
 
Having derived the optimal choice of the median voter for the situation where he can decide 
on the policy, we proceed by introducing a further stage. In this first stage, the representatives 
of both regions might agree on an overall capping of the budget, i.e. they can agree on a 
maximum amount which the budget is not allowed to exceed. It is important that this cap 
cannot be overruled in the second step.  
To fix this cap, both agents maximise their expected utility which arises from the decisions on 
the allocation made in the second step. Ex-ante, with a probability of 50%, this allocation is 
the allocation the own representative would choose (as determined in section 5.3), or, with a 
probability of 50%, it is the allocation the other region’s representative would choose 
(denoted in the following with a hat). 
Therefore, the expected utility for the representative from region i is ex-ante: 
(6) 
m m opt opt k k opt opt k k 2
ii i i i
m opt opt k k opt opt k k 2
ii i i
11
V [ ((1 )ln(g ) ln(G )) S (p2g qG (S (S ) )]
22
11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ [( ( 1) l n ( g ) l n ( G ) ) S ( p 2 g q G ( S ( S ) ) ]
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          
 
with k=i.  
Note that the overall budget of the central level is the sum of all of its expenditures, which is 
in case country i’s representative is in power:
opt opt opt k k 2 1
e 2pg qG S (S )
2
   . From the 
perspective of the representative from country i, in the first term of equation (6) his optimal 
level of e,
opt e , appears, because this represents the case in which he chooses his optimal   16
amount for every component. However, the second term’s level of e,
opt
i ˆ e , is in any case 
suboptimal from the perspective of country i's representative. Replacing the optimal quantities 
for the budget components with the amounts obtained in section 5.3, the optimal size of the 
overall budget in case country i’s representative is in power yields to:   
(7) 
2 mk k
opt ii ii
ii
(2 ) 1
e
2
     
   
 
Thus, in case country i‘s representative is in power, the cap has to lie below the expression 
given in equation (7) to be binding. In order to disclose which policy-maker would be affected 
by the cap, it is important to consider the optimal budget sizes from the representatives’ 
perspectives.     
Deriving (7) for  i   results in 
km
ii
3
i
(2 )    


, which is <0; deriving for 
k
i   yields to 

k
i
2
i


, which is >0.  
Generally, for both regions, a capping of the central budget may serve as an insurance against 
a too high allocation of redistributive payments for the case in which the other region’s 
representative can choose the policy. This argument becomes most obvious for the richer 
country: the optimum level of the budget decreases in the financing share i   as shown above.  
Therefore, the representative of the richer country 1 could gain from a cap even in the absence 
of redistributive payments in favour of country 2, as his demanded level of public goods is 
smaller than the level preferred by the representative of the poorer country. Hence, he has an 
incentive to enforce ex-ante a capping of the budget at a level 
max e , with 
max opt ˆ ee  . 
However, the poorer country might gain from the ex-ante commitment as well to restrict the 
budget (especially if he is risk averse): the capping of the budget increases his expected utility 
if the redistribution to the richer country in case the other country’s representative chooses the 
policy is not compensated by the advantages in the event of his own representative being in 
power. As the budget size increases in 
k
i  , the optimum capping for the poorer country can 
even be lower than for the richer country in case 
1
1   is relatively large compared to 
2
2  .  
However, if the two distribution patterns, 
1
i   and
2
i   , are identical in size (or do not differ too 
much), it can be concluded that the representative of the richer country 1 demands a stricter 
cap of the budget than his counterpart from country 2: 
max max
12 ee  .    17
This approach offers an explanation for the existence of the budget cap in the EU, which has 
been introduced in 1988. In the new Financial Perspective 2007-2013, the total level of 
spending of the EU budget is capped at 1.048% of the EU’s GNI. Reality also corresponds 
with the model insofar as mainly the richer member states stand for a lower level of maximal 
expenditure. In fact, in the run-up to the negotiations on the new Financial Perspective, some 
of the richest member states (Germany, Austria, Sweden, France, the Netherlands and the 
UK) even demanded a cap of the budget at a level of 1% (see Mrak & Rant, this volume). 
When this capping below the optimal expenditure levels (
opt
i e ) of both agents is taken as 
exogenous and when it is binding, it becomes obvious that in the second stage a suboptimal 
low level of public good provision results. Then, the resulting quantities are: 
 
m2 m2 2 m a x k2 m2 2
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i k2
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

, which are both increasing 
in 
max e.  
However, the ratio of allocation of the two kinds of public goods is independent from the 
question who chooses the policy, and it does not depend on the budget cap. This ratio is: 
i gq ( 1)
G2 p

 . This is in line with intuition, because the ratio of the marginal utilities, 
mm
ii
i
VV
gG


, is identical for both representatives and it is independent of the financing share 
( i  ).  
 
The resulting quantity for the redistributive good 
k Si s :  
m k m2 m2 2 m a x k2 m2 2
ii
i mk
i
q ( ) q(2 ) ( ) q ((1 2e )( ) ( ) ((2 ) ))
g
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The breakdown between public goods and redistribution depends on several characteristics: as 
it has to hold that 
mm
ii
k
i
VV
gS


 
, the allocation of public goods relative to redistributive 
spending increases with increasing spill-overs and public goods’ preferences, and it decreases 
with a higher share of participation of the country in the redistributive spending.  
For the individual utility maximisation it has yet to hold that the marginal utilities of the 
public good consumption equal the marginal utility of the private good consumption. Then,   18
the restriction in form of the overall budget capping at a level 
max opt
i ee  results in a reduction 
of both private and public good provision.  
All in all, it has to be noted that this institutional setting of a budget cap has positive and 
negative effects. On the one hand, the use of the redistribution channel is restricted by a 
capping of the expenditures, which increases the overall welfare. On the other hand, the 
provision of the public goods is reduced, and, disregarding the special case of this effect being 
overcompensated by the excessively high provision that was initially chosen by the poor 
country 2, it becomes suboptimal low.      
 
6  Effects of reform options for the EU financing 
 
In the reform debate, both sides of the budget are often regarded in isolation, so that remedies 
for spending inefficiencies are largely expected from measures addressing the expenditure 
side. One obvious approach is introducing national co-financing of EU policies which reduces 
the countries’ incentive to pursue policies that mainly benefit their own citizens. This finding 
also holds in the model-based approach of Dur and Roelfsema (2003), who show that the use 
of a central tax and subsidy scheme results in a more efficient outcome. 
In this section, it will be shown that the design of the revenue side might have a major impact 
on the national incentives on the expenditure side as well. For this purpose, the model 
developed above will be employed. In the following, three reform proposals for the revenue 
side of the EU budget are introduced, and their consequences on the allocation of the 
expenditures are scrutinised. The proposals include the introduction of (i) an EU tax, (ii) a 
generalised correction mechanism, and (iii) a generalised limited correction mechanism.   
 
 
6.1  Introduction of an EU tax  
 
The idea of the introduction of a tax which is directly payable to the EU, the so-called “EU 
tax”, is the most far-reaching reform option in the discussion on a reform of the revenue side 
of the EU budget. In the past, it has received support from European institutions (see 
European Commission, 2004), but also from academics (Cattoir, 2004; Le Cacheux, 2007).
12   
Regarding its impact on the expenditure structure, one feature of relevance of an EU tax 
which is elaborated by Osterloh, Heinemann und Mohl (2008) can be analyzed within the 
                                                 
12 In the following, an elaborate discussion of the EU tax will be omitted; for a detailed illustration of different 
options for such a tax, see Cattoir (2004). For an extensive analysis of pros and cons arriving at a negative 
assessment see Osterloh et al. (2008).     19
given model: the distribution of national contributions would no longer be proportional to the 
national income as it tends to be the case under the current contribution scheme, but would 
follow a different pattern. This pattern would critically depend on the tax base. For instance, 
the choice of VAT would lead to higher contributions for countries with higher consumption 
rates, or a tax on kerosene consumption would put a higher burden on countries with major 
airline hubs or with an important share of the tourism industry.  
To account for this effect in the model, the assumption of a contribution sharing according to 
the national GNI levels can no longer be maintained.
13 Instead, the national share of the 
contributions is determined by its share in the total base of the respective tax. This implies 
that the demand for public expenditures of the median voter, as determined in section 5.3, 
deviates from the point of departure if the national share in the tax burden, 
tax
i  , differs from 
GNI shares, i  . The following comparative statics are obtained: 

opt m
i
2
i i
g( 1 )
2p
 
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 
and 
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i i
G
p


 
. This shows that the provision of public goods declines with the share  i   
that country i has to contribute to the central level spending. If the new allocation pattern due 
to the introduction of an EU tax is closer to a 50:50 ratio, the demand for public goods will be 
closer to the social optimum; if the gap between the contribution shares widens, the allocated 
amount of public goods will become more inefficient.  
Comparative statics for the provision of the redistributive spending yields to 

kk
i
2
i i
S 

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. 
Again, this is negative, which indicates that it decreases in the share  i   that country i has to 
contribute to the central level spending. Regarding the resulting level of redistributive 
spending, 
k S , it is either possible that inefficiencies increase (in case the beneficiary countries 
are disburdened through an EU tax), or it is also possible that they decrease (in case the 
beneficiary countries have to spend more for the financing of an EU tax). Therefore, for any 
possible redistributive policy k, the outcome depends on the correlation between the change 
of the national contributions caused by the tax, 
tax
ii   , with the allocation of expenditures 
of the respective expenditure category, represented as 
k
ii   in the model. If there is a 
positive correlation, those countries which benefit from the respective expenditure category 
                                                 
13 Note that Besley and Coate (2000) present a similar approach by endogenising the financing of the central 
budget. In contrast to our model, the choice of the tax base is made independently from the decision on the 
expenditure allocation.   20
would bear a higher burden of the respective tax than those who do not benefit from this 
category. Hence, the replacement of national contributions by the respective tax increases the 
costs for the beneficiaries. In the model, this results in a lower aggregate demand for the 
transfer policies (as well as lower total central spending). A negative correlation denotes that 
the redistribution through the respective category becomes even cheaper and increases the 
demand for it, which implies a further crowding out of public goods by redistributive 
spending under a budget cap.    
This correlation can be examined in greater detail for the EU: in Table 1, the correlation 
coefficients for the most frequently proposed tax options and the two main spending 
categories, common agriculture policy and structural policy, are depicted. The change of the 
burden sharing caused by the taxes (
tax
ii   ) is estimated on the basis of the distribution of 
the tax bases as calculated in Osterloh et al. (2008). The allocation of spending (
k
ii  ) of 
the two expenditure categories is estimated for the year 2010 by means of a simulation model 
as introduced in Heinemann, Mohl and Osterloh (2008).  
      
Table 1: Correlation Coefficients between allocation of expenditure and distributive effect of 
EU taxes. 
 Value 
added 
tax 
Cigarettes Alcohol CO2 Fuel  Kero-
sene 
Foreign 
exchange 
transactions 
Agriculture -0.05  0.75  0.59  0.66  0.43  -0.30  -0.39 
Structural funds   0.12  0.65  0.94  0.75  0.57  -0.21  -0.26 
 
Table 1 indicates that for any expenditure category, the sign and the extent of the correlation 
coefficient crucially depend on the selected tax base. For instance, the demand for agricultural 
spending would increase if a tax on foreign exchange transactions were introduced, but it 
would diminish in the case of a tax on cigarette consumption were chosen. It can be 
concluded that according to the model, an EU tax can cause either an increase in redistributive 
spending or a decrease. 
 
 
6.2  Introduction of a Generalised Correction Mechanism 
 
A further reform option is the introduction of a generalised correction mechanism (GCM). 
This option was originally proposed by the German Ministry of Finance in 1996, and it is 
elaborated in more detail in European Commission (2004). Its objective is to avoid an   21
excessively high burden for single countries by granting correction payments to the negatively 
affected countries through a partial reimbursement of their net contributions. The design of 
such a mechanism can be regarded as an extension of the existing UK correction mechanism: 
the GCM focuses on the net position of a country, which is calculated as the difference 
between the country’s payments to the EU, and the EU expenditure which is allocated to the 
country. This difference is subject to a threshold a, expressed in % of national GNI. If this 
threshold is surpassed, a percentage b of any Euro exceeding this threshold is refunded to the 
country. This leads to correction payments for country i according to the following formula: 
(8) 
11 22
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i 11 22
iii i i
0,if Y g S S aY 0
z
b Yg S S a Y , e l s e
          
          
 
The financing of this refund takes place in proportion to the national shares in total GNI. To 
simplify matters, in the following the refund is designed in such a way that the beneficiary 
country is excluded from the financing of its reimbursement,
14 so that in the two-country 
model automatically results in: ii zz   .  
As it is assumed above that country 1 is in any case a net contributor, it invariably receives 
reimbursement payment from country 2, because the spending allocated to country 1 is lower 
than this country’s contributions: 
11 22 1 2
11 1 1 12 gSS ( g g S S ) 0       . In the simplest 
case of a threshold fixed at a level of zero, the following utility function arises for the 
representative of country 1 in case he is in power: 
(9) 
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The demand for the redistributive good  1 S  yields: 
1 11
11 1 1 1 1 S( b ( ) )
        .  
This is smaller than the amount in section 5.3, because 
1
11 ()    is negative and declines in 
the reimbursement rate b, so that the provision of the redistributive good shrinks compared to 
the status quo. 
The optimal provision of the local public good is now: 
m
m
1
11 2
(1 )
g
2p2 b ( )


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. It can be 
seen that an increase in the reimbursement rate leads to an increase in the provision of the 
local public good.   
                                                 
14 In general, 3 rules for the financing are imaginable: (i) a full participation of all countries in the financing, (ii) 
a participation of all countries in the financing of all reimbursements except its own correction, and (iii) a 
complete exclusion of the receiving countries in the financing of all reimbursements, see European Commission 
(2004)   22
For the poorer country, the utility is now equal to: 
(10) 
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The demand for the redistributive good 
2 S  yields : 
1 22
22 2 1 1 2 S( b ( ) )
       
As 
2
11 ()    is positive, the amount 
2 S is smaller than the amount in section 5.3. Again, the 
incentive to choose redistributive spending diminishes with an increase in b, as country 2’s 
representative internalises the worsening of country 1’s net position for which it has to pay 
reimbursements. 
For the local public good however, the optimal amount is: 
m
m
2
21 2
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g
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

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. This is 
smaller than the amount in section 5.3. As a consequence, from the point of view of the 
representative of country 2, with increasing b the allocation shifts from the provision of the 
redistributive and the local public good to the allocation of the European public good. This is 
intuitive, as the former goods improve the net position of the poorer country at the expense of 
the richer country, and thus increase the reimbursements to the richer country.  
Note that, independent from who constitutes the minimum winning coalition and chooses the 
policy, the provision of redistributive spending diminishes. The results for the local public 
goods are ambiguous: the provision increases compared to the status quo in case country 1’s 
representative constitutes the minimum winning coalition, or declines in the other case. All in 
all, it can be concluded that given an exogenous capping of the budget exists, as discussed in 
section 5.4, the share of the redistributive payments diminishes compared to the public goods, 
which implies a shift towards the social optimum. However, the direction of the change of the 
ratio of local and European public good remains unclear. In any case, the socially optimal 
ratio as shown in section 5.1, where the marginal utility of the two public goods are equal in 
the equilibrium, can no longer be attained. Therefore, a misallocation between the two public 
goods is the result. Either the local public good provision is too high in terms of the 
interregional public good, or it is too low.     
If this GCM were applied to the EU, one positive effect is evident: the incentive to attract 
redistributive payments diminishes for the net receiver as well as for the net payer. But at the 
same time, a misallocation between attributable and not attributable public goods might 
emerge.
15 In the model, the amount of the expenditures for the European public good G does 
                                                 
15 The differentiation between attributable and not attributable expenditure is of major importance for this 
mechanism. The link to the classification of expenditure actually applied in EU publications is as follows:   23
not have an impact on the correction z, so that in case the net payer constitutes the MWC, it 
can be expected that an introduction of a GCM leads to a shift from the local to the European 
public good.    
 
6.3  Introduction of a Generalised but Limited Correction Mechanism 
 
Finally, a further cutting-edge correction mechanism will be discussed: the generalised but 
limited correction mechanism (GLCM) which was recently introduced in the reform debate 
on the own resource system by Heinemann et al. (2008). The central idea of this mechanism is 
the same as for the generalised correction mechanism: all countries with an excessive net 
position are disburdened through correction payments (hence “generalised”). The difference 
to the GCM consists of limiting the expenditure categories which are taken account of in the 
calculation of the correction payments. Only the expenditures on some selected policy areas 
will be included in the calculation of the net positions that underlie the correction payments 
(hence “limited”). Heinemann et al. (2008) explicitly state that expenditures should be 
excluded which “can not be allocated to individual countries due to the nature of payments”, 
as well as those which “may be identifiable but this payment structure is no sensible proxy for 
the share of country benefits from that policy”. A prime example for the second category is 
expenditure which has public good properties, so that not only the country where the money is 
allocated benefits but other countries as well due to spill-overs.    
In the model, this modification of the correction mechanism implies the exclusion of the local 
public goods  i g  from the calculation of the correction payments, as these represent spending 
with public good properties. This changes the calculation of the correction payments to the 
following formula: 
(11) 
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The difference in the application of this mechanism compared to the GCM discussed above 
becomes obvious: as public good expenditures no longer appear in the calculation of the 
reimbursement payments, any interference of the correction mechanism in the decision on the 
                                                                                                                                                          
Targeted redistributive payments as well as local public good provision are completely attributable to the 
countries; expenditures for the European public good cannot be allocated to individual countries. This reflects 
the share in the EU budget which is reported as “non-allocable” in the EU Financial Reports, which amounted to 
8.57% of the total expenditures in 2006 (European Commission, 2007).   24
allocation of public goods is avoided. Consequently, the ratio of the allocated European public 
goods and local public goods is optimal under a budget cap, as shown in section 5.4.  
At the same time, this mechanism has the same effect on the provision of redistributive 
spending as the GCM. It decreases with an increasing reimbursement rate b, exactly as shown 
in section 6.2. This property reflects the flexibility of this mechanism, as it allows a variety of 
allocations depending on the choice of the reimbursement rate, reflected in the model as the 
parameter b. If this parameter is set at the value of zero, the correction mechanism will be 
inactive, which resembles to the situation stated in section 5.3. If the parameter b is set at the 
value of one, redistribution via the redistributive payments 
k S  completely loses its desirability 
for both countries: any difference in favouritism between the two countries in the allocation of 
the redistributive good is immediately neutralised through reimbursement payments. In this 
case, any representative in power would choose a zero amount of redistributive payments, 
which would imply a complete shift to the provision of public goods as indicated in section 
5.1. Eventually, if a value of b between zero and one is chosen, an allocation will result which 
lies between the non-cooperative solution and the social optimum. Thus, this mechanism has 
in common with the GCM that it reduces the incentives to strive for redistributive payments 
of both, net receiver and net payer, but in contrast to the GCM, the application of the 
mechanism does not distort the decision on the provision of the public goods.         
 
6.4  Intended Redistribution in the Model 
 
With its focus on the efficient provision of public goods, one weakness of the model 
presented above is that it does not offer much tolerance for the use of the budget for desired 
redistribution from poor to rich countries aside from the lower contribution payments of the 
poorer member state. In the real world, redistribution may be intended, for instance, for 
political or solidarity reasons, as it is the case in the European Union.  
In the light of our model, a first obvious solution for intended redistribution in the EU would 
be the use of unconditional transfer payments which reflect the intended degree of 
redistribution. A second solution can be found within the GLCM: payment categories with an 
intended redistribution pattern can be excluded from the calculation of the reimbursements 
within the mechanism. As this is not possible in a GCM, a further disadvantage of this 
mechanism becomes obvious: since (intended) redistribution inevitably worsens the budgetary 
balance of the net payers, the introduction of a generalised correction mechanism with the aim 
to reduce the burden of the net payers would lead to a partial diversion of the payments. This   25
would even lead to the inconsistent effect that an increase of cohesion payments would only at 
a small part be paid by the richer countries (see Heinemann et al., 2008).  
A further more sophisticated mechanism to align the efficient provision of public goods and 
redistribution targets in the European budget can be found in de la Fuente and Doménech 
(2001). In this approach, the national representatives agree in a first step on the net balances 
implying that they fix the degree of redistribution. In a second step, explicit expenditure 
programmes are negotiated, and, consequently, differences between the agreed and the actual 
degree of redistribution are corrected by lump sum transfers. In this approach, the decision on 
redistribution is successfully isolated from the decision on the allocation of expenditures, so 
that this approach also shows great promise for avoiding an interference of the common pool 
problem interferes with the decision on public good provision.        
 
7  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, a model based on the political economy approach with non-cooperative 
legislative behaviour of Besley and Coate (2003) was extended to explain in a first step the 
composition of EU expenditures, and in a second step, to identify the possible impact of 
reforms of the own resources systems on the allocation of the spending. The model was 
modified in order to allow for specific characteristics of the EU budget, such as the existence 
of income inequality and the existence of transfer policies with distinct distributive profiles. It 
was shown that the interaction of several institutional characteristics, i.e. the inclusion of 
targeted spending, the unequal financing by the member states and the capping of the overall 
expenditure, can provide an explanation for the bias of the budget towards redistributive 
payments and for an underprovision of efficiency-enhancing public goods. 
Moreover, three prevailing reform options for the revenue side of the budget were analysed in 
this framework. It was shown that, apart from its fiscal consequences, the incentive effects of 
these reform options should not be neglected. While an EU tax might reduce the incentives to 
attract redistributive spending, it might also have a counterproductive effect depending on the 
choice of the tax base and its distributive consequences. A generalised correction mechanism 
is regarded as positive in this regard, as it generally implies a shift from redistributive to 
public good provision. However, it might distort the provision of different public goods, 
depending on whether they are included in the correction mechanism or not. Finally, a 
generalised limited correction mechanism has the most promising features, as it also implies a 
shift from redistributive spending to public good provision, without distorting the decision on 
the allocation between local and European public goods.     26
Concerning promising further research, the next logical step would be an extension of our 
model approach towards cooperative behaviour, as it was similarly introduced by Besley and 
Coate (2003). This paper is restricted to a non-cooperative legislature, which has the 
advantage of clearly demonstrating the different incentives of net payers and net receivers in 
the European budget. However, as Dur and Roelfsema (2005) argue, this kind of approach has 
certain disadvantages: since a non-cooperative behaviour is ex-ante suboptimal, it is 
advantageous for legislations with relatively few representatives (as it is the case in the EU) to 
commit to cooperation. This would insure both jurisdictions against the disadvantageous 
outcome in case the other jurisdiction’s representative decides on the policy. This allows for a 
better insurance than the simple capping of the budget as discussed above. Moreover, the 
existing decision rules in the EU, which are often marked by unanimity, speak in favour of a 
cooperative legislature.  
Independent from these possible extensions, our analysis demonstrates that a thorough 
incentive based analysis is indispensable for the assessment of both the status quo and 
available reform options for the EU budget. 
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